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THE REVISED NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
RULE: COMPUTATION FOR COMPENSATION AND
RESTORATION
Over a decade ago, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation and Liability Act' (CERCLA) in response
to public concern over health and environmental risks associated with
hazardous waste sites.2 CERCLA provides for the recovery of cleanup
costs for hazardous waste removal and for the recovery of natural re-
source damages.' Most CERCLA litigation to date has centered around
the recovery of cleanup costs for contaminated sites; however, the focus
may soon shift to the recovery of monetary damages for injury to natural
resources caused by the release of hazardous substances.4 In April 1991,
the Department of the Interior (DOI) proposed a revision to CERCLA's
natural resource damage assessment rules5 for detailed assessments asso-
ciated with large hazardous waste releases (Type B releases).6 The draft
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988), as amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthoriza-
tion Act (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
2. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120. The legislative history of CERCLA indicated congressional concern for
the danger to both human health and the environment resulting from "improper[ ], negligent[ ], and
reckless[ ] hazardous waste disposal practices ... " as well as the inadequacy of existing law to
regulate the "inactive hazardous waste site problem." Id. In 1979, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) estimated that 1200-2000 sites presented grave health risks to the public. Id.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(aX4) provides:
[Alny person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal
or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which
there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government
or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with
the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the
reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release;
and
(D) the cost of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under section
9604(i) of this title.
4. See William Hamel, Superfund's Stealth Weapon, the Coming Battle Over Natural Re-
sources, TEXAS LAWYER, Jan. 6, 1992, at 19.
5. Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 56 Fed. Reg. 19,752 (1991) (to be codified at 43
C.F.R. pt. 11) (proposed Apr. 29, 1991) [hereinafter Revision].
6. Revision, supra note 5, at 19,752. The proposed rule addresses only Type B assessment
rules, which are "site-specific procedures for detailing assessments in individual cases." Id. The rule
does not affect Type A assessments, which include assessments requiring minimal field observation.
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rule significantly increases the amount of potential recovery, expands the
acceptable methods for assessing natural resource damages and provides
for recovery with respect to certain privately owned resources. 7 The
foreseeable consequences of the proposed rule certainly include a signifi-
cant impact on industry.'
Part I of this Recent Development discusses the recovery permitted
under CERCLA for natural resource damages and the regulations
promulgated by DOI in 1986. Part II examines the rejection of many
aspects of the DOI regulations in Ohio v. United States Department of
Interior.9 Part III analyzes DOI's proposed revisions to the assessment
rule. Finally, Part IV explores some of the possible effects of the pro-
posed rule on the future of natural resource damages.
I. NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE RECOVERY UNDER CERCLA
CERCLA imposes liability on certain persons 10 for damages for injury
to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources11 resulting from the release
of hazardous substances.12 Moreover, CERCLA authorizes federal and
state natural resource trustees1 3 to recover for such damages.14 At first
Id. See also Frank L. Amorso & Linda R. Keenan, Liabilityfor Restoration is Looming, NAV'L L.J.,
Feb. 4, 1991, at 19 (acknowledging that large oil spills and Superfund sites typically involve Type B
assessments).
7. See Revision, supra note 5. For a general discussion of the proposed DOI Rule, see infra
notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Hamel, supra note 4, at 18. "[I]t is difficult to imagine a more expansive - or,
from industry's point of view, more expensive - statutory program [than CERCLA]." Id. Hamel
predicted that natural resource damage claims will ultimately equal or exceed traditional damage
costs. Id.
9. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4) (1988).
11. The term "natural resources" includes "land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water,
drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, apper-
taining to, or otherwise controlled by the United States... [and] any state or local government...
42 U.S.C. § 9601 (16) (1988).
12. The term "release" includes "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying,
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the
abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any haz-
ardous substance or pollutant or contaminant)." 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (22) (1988).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9607()(1) provides that when an injury or destruction of natural resources
occurs, "liability shall be to the United States Government and to any State for natural resources
within the State .. " 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(1). CERCLA requires the President to designate federal
officials who will act as trustees for natural resources on behalf of the public. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(2)
(1988); 40 C.F.R. § 300.600(a) (1990). Generally, the designated federal trustee for a given resource
is the federal agency authorized to manage or protect that resource. 40 C.F.R. § 300.600(b) (1990).
See United States v. Southeastern Pa. Trans. Auth., 24 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1860, 1865 (E.D. Pa.
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blush, it is surprising that natural resource damages have not been tradi-
tionally a source of recovery under CERCLA. 15 However, natural re-
source damages have been largely unavailable for two reasons: (1) delay
in the promulgation of the original assessment rules; and (2) heavy re-
strictions and the undervaluing of resources in such rules. 16
A. The History of Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLM
Although Congress attempted to formulate a suitable hazardous waste
bill for several years, 7 CERCLA, as finally adopted, represented a last
minute effort by the 96th Congress and President Carter to address the
hazardous waste problem."5 Following CERCLA's enactment, President
Reagan delegated the responsibility for promulgating natural resource
damage rules to the DOI. 9 After several years, DOI promulgated
1986) (holding that CERCLA does not provide for a private right of action for natural resource
damages). See also Bedford, Mass. v. Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. 469,475 (D. Mass. 1991) (town of
Bedford as a municipality is not authorized to bring a CERCLA action to recover damages to natu-
ral resources). But see Boonton v. Drew Chem. Co., 621 F. Supp. 663 (D.N.J. 1985) (holding that
municipalities have standing to sue for natural resource damages under § 9607(a)(4)(c) of CER-
CLA). See also Duane Woodward & Michael R. Hope, Natural Resource Damage Litigation Under
the Comprehensive Environmental Reponse Compensation, and Liability Act, 14 HARV. ENVTm. L.
REV. 189, 212-15 (1990) (recommending that Congress amend CERCLA to allow private citizens to
file suit for natural resource damages when a federal or state trustee has failed to act).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(1) (1988). Authorized uses of recovered amounts include restoring,
replacing or acquiring the equivalent natural resources for purposes of returning each natural re-
source to its pre-release level.
15. Woodward & Hope, supra note 13, at 191 (noting that several advantages exist for bringing
damage claims under CERCLA, including providing an incentive for more rigorous cleanup to offset
potential damage recovery).
16. See id. at 192-93. Several reasons account for the under-utilization of the natural resource
damage provision, including: (1) trustee inexperience with natural resource claims; (2) indetermi-
nant methods of valuing natural resources under the federal statute; (3) delayed promulgation of
natural resource assessment rules by DOI; (4) discouragement of trustee's use of the assessment
regulations to determine injuries to natural resources; and (5) the lack of funds to assess natural
resource damages. d. See also Erik D. Olson, Natural Resource Damages in the Wake of the Ohio
and Colorado Decisions: Where Do We Go From Here?, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,551,
10,552 (Dec. 1989) (attributing the relatively few natural resource damage claims to the lack of
funds available for damage assessments, trustee apathy, and DOI's rule).
17. Congress initially addressed environmental problems in the Resource Conservation and Re-
cover Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1976) (regulating hazardous waste from its creation to
its disposal) and the Toxic Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1978) (regulating chemical produc-
tion). Congress worked on CERCLA bills for over three years. FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4A.02[2][a] (1990).
18. President Carter signed CERCLA on December 11, 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat.
2767 (1980).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c) requires that "[t]he President... shall promulgate regulations for the
assessment of damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources resulting from a
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highly restrictive rules for assessing natural resource damages.20 While
conformity with DOI regulations is not mandatory, assessments per-
formed in accordance with the rules enjoy a rebuttable presumption of
accuracy.2'
B. The 1986 DOI Type B Regulation
The 1986 Natural Resource Damage Assessment Rule required the
natural resource trustee to perform an Injury Determination, a Quantifi-
cation, and a Damage Determination in assessing natural resource
damage.22 The Damage Determination requirement created the most
problems for trustees.23 The regulations required the trustee to value the
resources injured, destroyed or lost based on restoration costs, replace-
ment costs and the diminution of use value of the injured resources.24
The regulations also provided methods for determining assessment
costs. 25 Finally, the rule required the trustee to select the "lesser of"
these costs as the measure of damages.26 Because restoration generally
represented the highest cost, trustees seldom selected it as the method of
choice under the rule. Rather, in applying the "lesser of" rule, trustees
were often compelled to select diminution of use value as the measure of
damages,2' and consequently awarded damages insufficient to restore the
release of oil or a hazardous substance ...." President Reagan delegated the responsibility for
promulgating damage assessment rules to the DOI. Executive Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923
(Jan. 23, 1987). During his campaign for the Office of President, Reagan repeatedly expressed his
dislike for environmental regulations. Once elected, Reagan recommended large budget cuts for the
EPA and DOI. See Woodward & Hope, supra note 13, at 205.
20. The Type B assessment regulations became effective on September 2, 1986. 43 C.F.R. pt.
11 (1986). These rules reflected recommendations from interested groups and resulted in restrictive
assessments of natural resource damage. See Woodward & Hope, supra note 13, at 206.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(O(2)(c) provides that "[a]ny determination or assessment of damages to
natural resources... made by a Federal or state trustee in accordance with the regulations promul-
gated under section 9651(c) of this title shall have the force and effect of a rebuttable presumption on
behalf of the trustee. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(2)(c) (1988).
22. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.60-.84 (Aug. 1, 1986).
23. See Craig S. J. Johns & John E. Dittoe, CERCLA Liability for Natural Resource Damages:
More Trouble Ahead for Real Property Owners, 9 CAL. REAL PROP. J. 22 (1991). Under the rule,
identification and quantification of the injury to natural resources was fairly clear; however, many
trustees found the damage determination phase problematic.
24. 43 C.F.R § 11.35 (1986) (adoption of the economic methodology determination).
25. 43 C.F.R. § 11.35(b)(2) (1986). See infra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
26. 43 C.F.R. § 11.35(b)(2). See infra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
27. See Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269, 325
(1989); see also Johns & Dittoe, supra note 23, at 29 (noting that the diminution in value method is
almost always a lower figure than the restoration or replacement methods).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss3/10
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resources to their pre-contaminated state.28
The regulations prescribed a hierarchy of methodologies to measure
lost use values29 of natural resources. Whenever reasonable, the regula-
tions required the trustee to value the natural resources at prevailing
market rates for the resource in its undamaged state.30 However, if no
market existed, the rule required the trustee to obtain an appraisal on the
value of the resource.3" Only if these market resource methodologies
proved impossible, could the trustee employ alternative methods32 to as-
sess the use value of the resource. If the trustee was unable to determine
the use value, the rule permitted him to estimate option33 and existence34
values.35 This rigidity resulted in an inflexible framework for assessing
the use value of natural resources.
For instance, the Exxon Valdez oil spill36 illustrates the devastating
effect that releases have on natural resources, as well as the difficulty
28. Cross, supra note 27, at 325 n.302. Cross argued that because many environmental re-
sources, such as wetlands, have a relatively low valuation under the Economic Methodology Deter-
mination, the restoration and replacement costs will always exceed the diminution of value. Id.
Thus, damage awards will rarely be sufficient to restore or replace injured resources. Id.
29. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(4)(b) defines use values as "the value to the public of recreational or
other public uses of the resource .. " 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(4)(b). See Cross, supra note 27, at 281
(noting that use values measure the monetary loss of the human uses of resources, such as fishing or
hunting).
30. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(1) states:
A determination shall be made as to whether the market for the resource is reasonably
competitive. Unless the authorized official determines that the market for the resource is
not reasonably competitive, the diminution in the market price of the resource shall be
used to estimate the damages to the injured resource.
31. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(2) (1986).
32. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(d) (1986). Alternatives included the factor income methodology, the
travel cost methodology, the hedonic price methodology, the contingent valuation methodology, the
unit value methodology, and other nonmarket resource methodologies that measure values in ac-
cordance with willingness to pay.
33. See Cross, supra note 27, at 285. Option value is the value placed on the preservation of
natural resources to retain the option of future use of natural resources. See also infra note 43 and
accompanying text.
34. Id. at 285-86. Existence value is the value placed on the preservation of natural resources
so that present and future generations can enjoy natural resources. See also infra note 44 and ac-
companying text.
35. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(bX2) (1986).
36. Philip Shabecoff, Largest US Tanker Spill Spews 270,000 Barrels of Oil Off Alaska, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 1989, at 1. See also Christine Cartwright, Note, Natural Resource Damage Assess-
ment: The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill and Its Implications, 17 RtrrGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 451
(1991). On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil tanker ruptured its tank, spilling hundreds of
thousands of gallons of oil into Prince Edward Sound. The oil inundated the ecosystem causing
severe damage to natural resources. The extent of the damage is still unknown.
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involved in assessing the extent of damage.37 Photographs of the tragic
oil spill depict serious damage to the Prince Edward Sound ecosystem.
Because no market exists to measure the value of the Prince Edward
Sound area or its inhabitants for diminution in value, the monetary value
of this damage is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain.38 The trustee
may value the natural resources that have a market, such as crabs, ac-
cording to the market price.39 In contrast, the trustee is forced to value
the resources without a market, such as the sea otter, as priceless, worth-
less or anywhere in between, depending on his personal assessment.
Whenever no market exists, the trustee may employ alternative meth-
ods to measure non-use values.' Both use and non-use values may be
measured by the contingent valuation method which elicits public opin-
ion regarding the value of the area before contamination.41 The trustee
may utilize this method to determine both the option value and the exist-
ence value of a resource.42 Option value represents the amount an indi-
vidual would be willing to pay for the option of enjoying the Prince
Edward Sound area at some future date.43 Existence value represents the
amount an individual would pay to ensure that the Prince Edward Sound
area remains in existence so that current and future generations may en-
37. See Cartwright, supra note 36, at 487-88.
38. See Michael Parrish, Secret Studies Put Spill Damage at $15 Billion, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8,
1991, at Al (reporting that unpublished studies indicate that the damage from the Exxon Valdez
spill may eventually total or exceed $15 billion). See also Michael J. Mandel, How Much is a Sea
Otter Worth?, Bus. WK., Aug. 21, 1989, at 59.
39. See Mandel, supra note 38. The direct loss to users is an easy measure for intangibles. For
example, damage caused by a polluted river may be measured in terms of the loss of recreational
activities, such as swimming and fishing.
40. Raymond J. Kopp et al., Natural Resource Damages: The Economics Have Shifted After
Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,127, 10,128
(Apr. 1990). Non-use values do not depend on a close physical connection between an individual
and a source, whereas use values depend on such in situ activities. Non-use values include the
knowledge that the Grand Canyon exists, and the preservation of certain species based on the belief
that future generations will benefit from its existence. Use values, on the other hand, include fishing,
swimming, boating, camping and birdwatching. Id.
41. 34 C.F.R. § 11.83(d)(5) (1986). Contingent valuation method measures the loss of non-use
values based on polls of how much individuals would pay for a resource in a hypothetical market.
For a detailed analysis of contingent valuation of natural resource damage, see Carl V. Phillips &
Richard J. Zeckhauser, Contingent Valuation of Damage to Natural Resources: How Accurate? How
Appropriate?, 4 Toxic L. Rep. (BNA) 520 (Oct. 4, 1989).
42. 34 C.F.R. § 11.83(d)(5) (1986). The rule permits the use of contingency valuation to esti-
mate option and existence value only if the authorized official believes that no use value can be
determined.
43. See Cross, supra note 27, at 285-86 (explaining that an individual may one day desire to see
Yosemite National Park, and therefore would value its preservation).
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joy its natural resources." Consequently, measuring non-use with con-
tingent value, a Missouri citizen, for example, who never intends to visit
Prince Edward Sound, may still suffer a measurable loss as a result of the
oil spill.4" While the contingent value method may seem haphazard,46
studies of public opinion have achieved consistent results. 7
Despite the use of contingent valuation to determine both option and
existence non-use values, the diminution of use value approach, as the
primary methodology of assessing natural resource damages, is widely
criticized. While some economists hail diminution of value as the most
efficient method of computation," many criticize it as undervaluing nat-
ural resources.49 These critics argue that because natural resources are
not fungible goods that may be easily valued, market values are not the
most appropriate measure of damages.5 0 Consequently, as a method of
assessing resource damages, the diminution in value approach provides
44. See Mandel, supra note 38, at 62 (giving as an illustration one survey which found that
California residents would be willing to pay about $250 million annually to preserve Mono Lake,
even if they never visited it). See also Cross, supra note 27, at 291. Cross argued that existence
values can be manipulated by keeping the public ignorant of natural resource damage. He explained
this potential problem with reference to the endangered snail darter:
For example, anyone familiar with environmental law is aware of the great importance that
was placed on the preservation of the endangered snail darter, primarily due to its existence
value. Suppose that an endangered cousin of the snail darter lived in other streams, but we
were wholly unaware of its existence. Our lack of awareness translates into a lack of exist-
ene value for this species. Existence value thus creates a perverse incentive to keep the
public ignorant of the characteristics and attributes of the natural world.
Id.
45. See Kopp et al., supra note 40, at 10,130 (emphasizing the greatly expanded number of
people capable of experiencing a measurable loss as a result of a release of hazardous substances or
oil).
46. Some commentators question the accuracy of non-use values, such as existence values, be-
cause the public is not asked "to put their money where their mouths are." See Cross, supra note 27,
at 282. Consequently, reliance on use values is not without justification. Id.
47. See Cross, supra note 27, at 317 (noting the "internal consistency and replicability of con-
tingent valuation survey results").
48. See, ag., Edward J. Yang, Valuing Natural Resource Damage" Economics for CERCLA
Lawyers, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,311, 10,317 (Aug. 1984) (favoring the diminution in
value approach as the economically correct approach).
49. Cross, supra note 27, at 331-32 (favoring restoration costs as consistent with the legislative
intent and public policy of CERCLA).
50. In rejecting the DOI's argument that diminution of value method was more efficient than
the restoration cost method, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that "[t]he
fatal flaw of Interior's approach ... is that it assumes that natural resources are fungible goods, just
like any other, and that the value to society generated by a particular resource can be accurately
measured in every case .. " Ohio v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 456 (D.C.
Cir. 1989). For a discussion of Ohio v. United States Dept. of the Interior, see infra notes 52-64 and
accompanying text.
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for insufficient recovery. Only restoration value assures full recovery
from the contamination.51
II. THE OHIO V. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR DECISION
In Ohio v. United States Department of Interior, several states and en-
vironmental groups challenged DOI's natural resource damage rule.52 In
Ohio, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia53 invalidated
two important aspects of DOI's natural resource damage assessment reg-
ulation.54 First, the court rejected the "lesser of" rule, finding it directly
contrary to the express intent of Congress.5" The court recognized con-
gressional intent to establish a preference for restoration cost as the basis
for recovery.56 Thus, the court held that the measure of natural resource
51. See Barry Breen, CERCLA's Natural Resource Damage Provisions: What Do We Know So
Far?, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,304, 10,310 (Aug. 1984) (arguing that, at a minimum,
CERCLA allows recovery of the cost of full restoration); see also Heidi Wendel, Note, Restoration as
the Economically Efficient Remedy for Damage to Publicly Owned Natural Resources, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 430, 455 (1991) (concluding that restoration is the only remedy that compensates the public
adequately for its loss from damage to natural resources).
52. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Ten states, three environmental organizations, a chemical
industry trade association, a manufacturing company and a utility company sought review of the
DOI natural resource regulations. Id. at 438.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 9613 grants the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia jurisdiction to
review any regulation promulgated under CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (1988).
54. In addition to invalidating the "lesser of" rule and the "hierarchy at assessment methodol-
ogy" adopted by DOI, the court also narrowly construed and then upheld the "committed use"
requirement. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 462. This rule only allowed a trustee to consider committed uses,
defined in 43 C.F.R. § 11.84(b)(2), as either "a current public use; or a planned public use.., for
which there is a documented legal, administrative, budgetary, or financial commitment established
before the discharge of oil or release of a hazardous substance is detected." Id. The court upheld
the "committed use" requirement, concluding that a trustee may recover the costs of restoring or
replacing the resource even when the resource has no "committed use." Id. at 462. The court's
decision leaves intact the "committed use" requirement for assessing damages when the trustee seeks
to recover diminution of use. Id. at 461-62.
Additionally, the court upheld DOI's adoption of "contingent valuation" techniques as "the best
available procedure" for assessing damages under the diminution of use methodology. Id. at 474-81.
55. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 441-59. The court proclaimed that the "lesser of" rule was the "most
significant issue in this case." Id. at 441. For a discussion of the "lesser of" rule, see supra notes 26-
28 and accompanying text.
56. Id. at 444. The court premised the preference for restoration cost on 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0,
which provides that damages recovered are "for use only to restore, replace, or acquire the
equivalent of such natural resources." Id. The court also inferred this preference from CERCLA's
settlement provision which requires that "the potentially responsible party agree to undertake appro-
priate actions necessary to protect and restore the natural resources damaged by [the] release or
threatened release of hazardous substances." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9622(j)(2)).
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damages should be restoration costs,57 except where they are completely
disproportionate to the value of the resource.5"
Second, the court rejected the rigid hierarchy of permissible methodol-
ogies imposed by the regulations.59 The court found that the hierarchical
structure and exclusive reliance on market value' contradicted Con-
gress' intent to assure full compensation for natural resource damage.61
Because DOI's exclusive use of market value constituted an unreasonable
interpretation of CERCLA,62 the court directed DOI to develop new
regulations permitting consideration of all reliable use and non-use val-
ues necessary for full recovery.63
The court also ordered DOI to clarify the extent to which the regula-
57. The court rejected DOI's argument that the "lesser of" rule represented the most economi-
cally efficient method of measuring natural resource damage from the discharge of hazardous sub-
stances and oil. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 456. DOI argued that it would be economically inefficient to
restore a resource if the costs exceeded its value. Id. In rejecting this argument, the court was
skeptical of human ability to measure the true value, particularly non-use value, of natural resources.
Id. at 456-57.
58. The court recognized that circumstances may arise where restoration is not the best stan-
dard. Id. at 459. For example, the court stated that in a situation where restoration is infeasible or
its cost is grossly disproportionate to use value, the situation would warrant a different standard. Id.
See also Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 912
(1981).
In Colocotroni, Puerto Rico and the local environmental quality board sued the owner of a tanker
under a state statute to recover for environmental damage to the coastline resulting from an oil spill.
628 F.2d at 656. The court rejected the diminution in value rule. "A strict application of the dimi-
nution in value rule would deny the state any right to recover meaningful damages for harm to such
areas, and would frustrate appropriate measures to restore or rehabilitate the environment." Id. at
673. Instead, the court adopted the restoration method for situations in which restoration would be
physically possible and its costs would not be grossly disproportionate to the value of the resource.
Id. at 675. However, on the facts of the Colocotroni case, the court concluded that restoration was
inapplicable because it appeared infeasible, and the government did not intend to restore the site. Id.
at 676.
59. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 464.
60. Id. at 462-63. The court stated that "[flrom the bald eagle to the blue whale and snail
darter, natural resources have values that are not fully captured by the market system." Id. Conse-
quently, market price is not always a reasonable means of use value. Id. at 463.
61. Id. at 463. The court concluded that Congress intended to provide the trustee with the
ability to select the most accurate method of assessment from a range of acceptable damage assess-
ment methodologies detailed in the Senate's CERCLA report. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 848, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 85-86 (1980)). Therefore, the hierarchical structure "defeat[ed] this intent by arbi-
trarily limiting use values to market prices." Ohio, 880 F.2d at 463.
62. The court stated that "[w]hile it is not irrational to look to market price as one factor in
determining the use value of a resource, it is unreasonable to view market price as the exclusive
factor, or even the predominant one." Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 481.
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tions applied to privately owned resources." While acknowledging that
CERCLA excludes recovery for purely private resources, the court
concluded that Congress did not specifically limit the application of
CERCLA to resources actually owned by the government. 65 The court
stated that CERCLA's definition of "natural resources"6 6 indicated that
Congress intended that the provision also apply to private property in
which the government has an interest.67
III. THE REVISED DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR RULE
In response to the Ohio decision, DOI recently proposed several signif-
icant revisions to its damage assessment rules.68 The new DOI rule does
more than merely comply with the court's order;69 it broadens the ac-
ceptable measures of damages and methods for measuring these values.
The revised rule confers more freedom of action on the trustee in making
the assessments. In addition, the revision provides necessary guidance to
assist the trustee in making the proper determination. 0
First, DOI's revised rule conforms to the court's decision, which estab-
lished a preference for restoration cost as the measure of damages.
Although DOI did not disturb the actions trustees may consider and the
corresponding costs trustees may use as the measure of damages, the pro-
posed rule eliminates the "lesser of" rule. Thus, the revised rule grants
trustees flexibility to adopt the best plan for the specific site.7' To allow
the trustee to find the most suitable plan, the proposed rule provides for a
64. Id. at 461.
65. Id. at 460. Although DOI adopted CERCLA's definition of "natural resources" verbatim
in its regulations, the definition contradicted the preamble to the regulations, which indicated that
privately owned resources were not covered by the natural resource damage provisions of CERCLA.
Id. at 460-61.
66. See supra note 11.
67. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 461. The court concluded that Congress must have intended the natural
resource damage provision to apply to certain privately owned resources. Specifically, the court
reasoned that such an interpretation is necessary to give meaning to the wide range of government
interests included in the definition of natural resources, and implied by the words "managed by, held
in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by." Id. at 460 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16)).
68. See Revision, supra note 5.
69. Revision, supra note 5, at 19,756. To comply with the court's decision, DOI only needed
to: (1) remove the "lesser of" requirement; (2) eliminate the hierarchical structure of economic
valuation; (3) delete the provision restricting recovery of non-use values to situations where the
trustee can not determine use values; and (4) clarify the extent to which the rule applies to privately
owned resources. Id.
70. See infra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
71. See Revision, supra note 5, at 19,756.
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wide range of actions geared toward returning the site to its pristine
state.7 2 Not only must a trustee weigh several factors when deciding
which value is most appropriate for the particular circumstances,7" he
must also explain the balancing process which led to his selection.74 Ad-
ditionally, the proposed rule allows for the recovery of value of the serv-
ices lost to the public, including non-use values, until restoration is
complete.75  Adopting restoration as the preferred method of recovery
and allowing for the recovery of use and non-use values lost during the
restoration period, DOI formulated new damage assessment criteria.
Simply, the new formula for assessing damages equals restoration plus
the compensable value76 of the natural resource for the restoration
period.
Second, the revised regulations eliminate the previously rigid hierar-
chy of assessment methods. DOI still considers the market price meth-
odology as the most reliable methodology, but now recognizes that
circumstances may exist where the market price inadequately represents
the value of the resource.7 7 Accordingly, the rule grants trustees the
72. The trustee may choose from a wide range of actions to return the natural resource to
baseline levels, including: (1) intensive restoration in a short period of time; (2) combination of
restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, and/or acquisition in order to optimize recovery; (3) re-
placement or acquisition of equivalent resources; and (4) natural recovery of the resource. Id. at
19,757.
73. The listed factors include: (1) technical feasibility; (2) cost-benefit relationship for restora-
tion, rehabilitation, replacement, and/or acquisition of equivalent resources; (3) cost-effectiveness;
(4) results; (5) potential injury resulting from proposed action; (6) natural recovery period; (7) ability
of the resource to recover naturally; (8) acquisition of equivalent land where restoration, rehabilita-
tion, and/or other replacement of land is not possible; (9) potential effects of the action on human
health and safety; and (10) consistency with federal and state laws. Revision, supra note 5, at
19,757.
74. Id.
75. Id. The rule defines the term "services" to include all of the functions of the resource for
the benefit of the public or other resources.
76. The drafters of the revised rule defined compensable value as:
the amount of money required to compensate the public for the loss in services provided by
the injured resources between the time of the discharge or release and the time the re-
sources and the services those resources provided are fully restored to their baseline condi-
tions. The compensable value includes the value of lost public use of the services provided
by the injured resources, plus lost nonuse values such as option, existence, and bequest
values.
Id. at 19,772.
77. Id. at 19,759. The revised rule states a preference for relying on market values where the
market captures the full value of the resource. However, DOI acknowledges that the existence of a
competitive market does not guarantee that the market price fully captures the value of the resource.
The rule leaves such a determination to the trustee's discretion, but requires him to state the ration-
ale supporting such a determination in the Assessment Plan.
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freedom to select any listed valuation method or any combination of ap-
proaches provided that they are reliable, cost-effective and not duplica-
tive.78 To ensure compliance and clarity, the trustee must state in the
assessment plan the rationale supporting the methodology selected. 9
Finally, DOI's proposed rule permits trustees to sue for damages on
privately owned resources, provided that some legitimate government in-
terest exists in the property. In addition, DOI reiterated CERCLA's def-
inition of natural resources, 80 to connote the wide range of interests the
government may have in natural resources.81 To safeguard compliance
with CERCLA, the trustee must cite some specific authority for asserting
a right to act as a trustee over the resource.
IV. THE FUTURE OF NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES
CERCLA provides federal and state trustees with a liability provision
to recover damages for natural resources. Until recently, natural re-
source damage claims have been a relatively minor part of Superfund
cases. In response to the Ohio decision, DOI proposed meaningful revi-
sions to the natural resource damage rule. The revised DOI rule will
significantly impact current and future natural resource claims.82 Under
the revised rule, (1) recovery will more accurately reflect damages to nat-
ural resources; (2) the bargaining position of the respective parties will
dramatically change; and (3) larger sums of money will be awarded both
in settlements and litigation to compensate the public for natural re-
source damages.
Because the proposed rule allows the trustee to choose the methodol-
78. Id. at 19,771.
79. Id.
80. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
81. See Revision, supra note 5, at 19,761. The broad language encompasses a wide range of
legitimate government interests in privately owned natural resources.
82. The revised rule may also revive potential natural resource damage claims. CERCLA pro-
vides that an action for natural resource damages must be commenced within three years after the
later of(1) the date of the discovery of the loss and its connection with the release; or (2) the date the
natural resource regulations are promulgated. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(1). When DOI promulgated the
original Type B regulations in 1986, and amended them in 1988, some concern existed over the
applicable starting date for the statute of limitations. See Johns & Dittoe, supra note 23, at 32-33.
DOI alleviated concern over the impending tolling of the three year statute of limitations by reset-
ting the clock on natural resource damage claims. The new rule states that suits must be brought
within three years after the discovery of damages or promulgation of the final rule, whichever occurs
later. Revision, supra note 5, at 19,761. The renewal of the statute of limitations provides trustees
more flexibility to bring new claims for old disasters under the new regulations.
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ogy for assessing natural resource damages, the sums will more accu-
rately reflect the damage caused to the resource. The large sums of
money at stake will induce the potentially liable parties to aid in the as-
sessment process, perhaps by hiring their own economists to assess the
damage, 3 and thereby increasing the accuracy. 4 Additionally, the res-
toration plus compensable costs formula will generally increase the dam-
age assessments, because the rule allows for full compensation for the
interim loss of natural resources.
The increase in damage assessments and the freedom to select the
methodology to be used in assessing damages will catapult the trustees
into a stronger bargaining position with respect to claims of natural re-
source damages.8 5 In addition, the potential for substantial court awards
provides incentive for the parties to avoid litigation and settle the claim.
The revised regulation has the potential to increase the frequency of
natural resource damage claims, and, thus, force polluters to pay for the
damage that pollution causes to natural resources. Recent CERCLA set-
tlements have included specific funds earmarked for natural resource
damages, illustrating the large sums of money involved. 6 In addition,
the recent revisions create a greater power to force polluters to pay for
the damages they cause.8 7 Ideally, when polluters are required by law to
pay the restoration costs and non-use costs associated with injury to nat-
83. See Michael Parrish, The Industry Is Quickly Maturing As Major Companies Enter the
Field and New Markets Open Up, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 28, 1991, at D2 (noting the growth in environ-
mental firms and proliferation of the number of economists hired to consult on assessments of natu-
ral resource damages).
84. See Amoroso & Keenan, supra note 6, at 23 (noting that government trustees have been
receptive to potentially responsible parties' involvement in the assessment process).
85. See Kopp et al., supra note 40, at 10,131. The new regulation strengthens the trustee's
bargaining position because restoration costs will generally exceed diminution in value. Diminution
in value will probably serve as a floor for damage awards, forcing settlements to more accurately
reflect restoration costs.
86. The EPA and AVX Corp. announced a settlement agreement in which AVX agreed to pay
S66 million for cleanup and natural resource damages. See Amoroso & Keenan, supra note 6 at 22.
A Shell oil spill resulted in a 19.75 million settlement of which $I 1 million was specifically desig-
nated to restore natural resources. Id
87. Standard form insurance policies may cover polluters. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.
v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. 1990) (insurance policy covers CERCLA liability);
Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1990); C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v.
Indus. Crankshaft & Eng'g Co., 388 S.E.2d 557 (N.C. 1990).
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ural resources, they will become more cautious and strive to avoid incur-
ring liability.
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